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Explaining away corruption in pre-modern Britain 
Mark Knights 
University of Warwick 
 
In 1621 Francis Bacon, luminary of the English Renaissance and Lord Chancellor, was tried in 
Parliament for corruption. There were many things which made his case unusual – such as 
the revival of the impeachment process after 150 years of disuse and the degree of political 
factionalism that lay behind the accusations – but perhaps the most striking was Bacon’s 
apparent readiness to admit his guilt. On 30 April 1621 he made his confession to the House 
of Lords: ‘I do plainly and ingenuously confess that I am guilty of corruption; and do 
renounce all defence’. He confessed to each of the 28 articles against him and concluded by 
again admitting that there had been ‘a great deal of corruption and neglect’ in his conduct 
for which he was ‘heartily and penitently sorry’.1 Bacon acknowledged receiving £11-12,000 
worth of bribes from suitors who appeared in court before him.  
Such candour was almost unprecedented in the history of pre-modern corruption in Britain. 
Nearly every other person or institution accused of corruption mounted a reasonably 
vigorous public defence to assert their innocence or deny why their actions constituted 
corruption. Even Bacon, for all his apparent honesty, sought to offer Parliament extenuating 
circumstances and explanations for his conduct. And he privately believed himself the victim 
of a political ‘game’ rather than being genuinely corrupt. In an earlier letter to his patron, 
the (far more corrupt) duke of Buckingham, Bacon claimed ‘I know I have clean hands and a 
clean heart’; and Bacon was ready to tell the King that with respect to the charge of bribery, 
he was ‘as innocent as any born upon St. Innocent’s Day, in my heart’. He said that when 
‘the books of hearts shall be opened, I hope I shall not be found to have the troubled 
fountain of a corrupt heart in a depraved habit of taking rewards to pervert justice; 
howsoever I may be frail and partake of the abuse of the times’.2 In his more robust and 
defiant moments, Bacon argued that nothing he had received had perverted his legal 
judgement, since he had merely accepted a gift after he thought the legal case had ended 
and some of the money he had accepted came from those he gave verdicts against – which 
is partly why they complained against him!3 Even when resolving ‘not to trick up my 
innocency (as I writ to the Lords) by cavillations and voidances’ he referred to the money he 
had received as ‘briberies and gifts’, suggesting a confusion between these two categories 
                                                          
1 James Spedding (ed.), The Letters and the Life of Francis Bacon (1874), vii. 252-262. For an 
overview of Bacon’s case see John Noonan, Bribes (New York, 1984), chapter 12; Nieves 
Mathews, Francis Bacon. The History of a Character Assassination (New Haven, 1996).  
2 Spedding, Letters, vii. 213, 225-6. 
3 Ibid, 236-8. 
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that, as we shall say, was widely shared. So even this unique case of admission of guilt was 
hedged, in private at least, by reasons to explain or deny his corruption. 
This article will explore others in pre-modern Britain who were accused of corruption and 
who denied guilt and made defences, disavowals, justifications, protests, vindications or at 
least sought to explain away, rationalise or legitimise their behaviour, both to themselves 
and to others. Focusing on the strategies and arguments used by the allegedly corrupt has 
both historical and philosophical value. Very little work has been done on how people in the 
past responded to accusations and indeed we still lack a general history of pre-modern 
corruption, even though the data available to us is rich and Britain’s stage of state formation 
at the time contains many parallels with modern, developing countries.4 We have quite a 
few case-studies of particular moments in the history of British corruption, but no study of 
how the forces of anti-corruption were neutralised so effectively that reform took several 
hundred years. The historical record may thus help us think about the speed at which anti-
corruption can work in the face of denial and what arguments it can expect to encounter, 
even in the present.  
The defences studied here are nevertheless a particular type of justification. They are from 
individuals, rather than institutions; and they generally deal with a particular type of 
corruption that conforms to the modern definition of ‘the abuse of public office for private 
gain’. My focus is deliberate in order to show that this notion of corruption was not merely a 
nineteenth century invention, even if its contours were disputed before then (and remain 
contested). Given the resonance between past and present, the modern definition is also 
the meaning of corruption that is most likely to make sense to readers of this journal. 
However, it is worth noting at the outset that such a definition is a limiting one, relating to 
only a subset of responses to accusations, since the definition of corruption in the early 
modern period was very wide. Corruption in the sixteenth and seventeenth century was 
primarily used in relation to protestant notions of the corruption (institutional and 
theological) of the Catholic church and of original sin. Corruption also had a strong moral 
sense, applicable to the sexual mores of individuals and nations, and also to the indulgence 
in vice of other types.5 Political corruption could mean the abuse of office for private gain 
but equally it carried a more Machiavellian or republican sense, relating to the decay of a 
governmental system as a whole and to the lack of political virtues in the nation as a whole, 
rather than individuals.6 The moral and political senses come together in an image of 1740 
                                                          
4 This article is part of a larger project examining pre-modern corruption, to be published by 
Oxford University Press. 
5 David Hayton, ‘Moral Reform and Country Politics in the Late Seventeenth-Century House 
of Commons’, P&P vol. 128 no.1 (1990), 48-89; Martin Ingram, ‘Reformation of Manners in 
Early Modern England’, The Experience of Authority ed. Paul Griffiths, Adam Fox and Steve 
Hindle, 47-88.  
6 Bruce Buchan and Lisa Hill, An Intellectual History of Political Corruption (Basingstoke, 
2014); J. G.A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment (Princeton, 1975); Pocock, Virtue, 
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satirising Sir Robert Walpole, who in the eyes of his critics systematically bribed politicians 
to become subservient to the executive and thereby subverted the principles of 
independence and love of the public good that should motivate them. The hoop being 
bowled between his legs thus has a list of vices: "Wealth", "Pride", "Vanity", "Folly", 
"Luxury", "Want", "Dependence", "Servility", "Venality", "Corruption" and "Prostitution".  
The pre-modern world was also deeply concerned with the corrupting influence of bad 
ideas, and hence was also worried about print that dispersed them. Finally, corruption was 
also used as a way of talking about disease and bodily decay – which in turn became 
available as a metaphor to describe political and economic corruption. 7  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Commerce and History: Essays on Political Thought and History, Chiefly in the Eighteenth 
Century (Cambridge, 1985). 
7 Margaret Healy, Fictions of Disease in Early Modern England: Bodies, Plagues, and Politics 
(New York, 2001); Bianca Ryan-Lopez, ‘Corruption and Infected Sin: The Elizabethan 
Rhetoric of Decay’, UCLA PhD (2009). 
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The prosecutions or allegations which provoked many of the responses analysed below 
stemmed from blurred legal boundaries – and indeed, the silences of the law were often 
invoked as justification for why behaviour could be justified as licit. Over the course of the 
early modern period legislation was passed to try to deal with specific abuses but it was very 
piecemeal – the sale of office, for example, which was proscribed in 1555 and again, more 
extensively, in 1809 – and spasmodic, often enacted on the back of particular scandals or 
moments of ‘moral reform’. Indeed, the law often had large holes. The legislation about 
bribery was focused only on electoral and judicial crime; and the paucity of pre-modern 
legislation about what we would now consider corrupt behaviour meant a reliance either on 
a general catch-all charge of ‘high crimes and misdemeanours’ that could be pursued in 
parliamentary trials – such as the impeachment process revived for Bacon – or on 
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institutional regulations or on a notion of ‘breach of trust’, which emerged in the mid-
seventeenth century.8 So a simple defence was that because the law did not specifically 
proscribe a certain activity, it could not be corrupt. 
The defences set out below nevertheless go further than this and were in part an attempt to 
cope with, neutralise, and constrain the effects of public scandal – a phenomenon that 
complicated any corruption allegation.9 Scandal was magnified in public with the aid of a 
reverberating set of emotions such as anger and contempt; combatting scandal thus 
required arguments that countered such emotions and offered reasoned responses that 
could provide an alternative narrative. This, fortunately for the historian, meant that scandal 
had generally to be countered in public - in Parliament, in courts, in print – albeit aided with 
private persuasion in correspondence. Occasionally we have a private memoir or diary – 
though sometimes these too were intended for public consumption, perhaps at a later time.  
In what follows I identify many different – though sometimes overlapping – ways of 
responding to accusations of corruption, though these can be grouped into six categories. 
The first group appealed to social mores that, it was claimed, were ubiquitous and hence 
innocent: friendship, patronage, gift-giving, reward for hard work. The second set of 
responses saw the behaviour under scrutiny as in some sense authorised - by those who 
exercised power or by custom. A third line of defence exploited the blurred boundary 
between what was public and what was private, or argued that private advantage was 
compatible with, or even necessary for, the public good. A fourth, more negative set of 
reactions voiced feelings of being unfairly picked upon and a conviction that attacks were 
politically motivated in order to advance the interests of individuals or groups. A fifth type 
of vindication highlighted the alternative morality or ethical value-system encountered in 
transnational trade and rule. A final set of arguments rested on technical issues of 
accounting – although apparently the most prosaic, such responses nevertheless raised 
interesting questions about how corruption could be prevented.  
The following data, primarily from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, shows that 
corruption is not merely a modern phenomenon and that these older cases have plenty of 
resonances with refutations made today in economic or political scandals.10 Historical data is thus 
                                                          
8 See my ‘Anti-corruption and the notion of trust’ in ***. 
9 For reflections on scandal see Ari Adut, On Scandal. Moral Disturbances in Society, Politics 
and Art (Cambridge, 2008) 
10 A social science literature also explores how corruption can become routinized through 
rationalisations in business: Vikas Anand, Blake E. Ashforth and Mahendra Joshi, ‘Business 
as Usual: The Acceptance and Perpetuation of Corruption in Organizations’, The Academy of 
Management Executive (1993-2005), Vol. 19, No. 4, (Nov., 2005), 9-23; Amy Guerber, 
Aparna Rajagplan and Vikas Anand, ‘The Influence of National Culture on the Rationalisation 
of Corrption’ in Ronald Burke and Edward Tomlinson (eds.), Crime and Corruptions in 
Organisations: Why it Occurs and What to do about it (2011). There is much less on 
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‘philosophy teaching by examples’.11 In evaluating the justifications, excuses and explanations 
contemporaries had – and we, as historians or philosophers today have - three choices: we 
can accept them as sincere and persuasive; we can reject them as self-interested pleadings 
that fail to convince; or we can exercise judgement about the degrees of individual 
culpability and breaches of societal norms. In all three circumstances a judgement was or is 
being made about what constitutes corruption. Both the state and its citizens have to be as 
clear as they can about how they define integrity, and judge whether there was/is an 
intention to break, subvert or manipulate moral codes. Thus it is not merely the law court, 
but also the court of public opinion, that decides such matters; and debates about the 
acceptability of defences against allegations are an important part of a process of public 
debate about where society has drawn, or does now draw, ethical lines. We can push this 
definitional point further and suggest a number of general maxims that are at play in the 
following cases:  
a) Normalisation of corruption occurs through rationalisations that re-interpret 
controversial behaviour in a positive light. The need to do so underlines the moral 
charge of corruption allegations and the need to counter it. 
b) The boundaries between corrupt and non-corrupt are not always clear, and were/are 
contestable. The law alone is often insufficient to determine corruption and 
inadequate in defining it. 
c) Social/cultural norms are powerful and blur the boundaries between licit and illicit 
behaviour.  
d) Corruption can be difficult to ‘call’ because it is a concept that is easily subjected to 
many challenges and redefinitions of a legal, moral, social and cultural nature.  
e) The courts, the state and the public are repeatedly called on to evaluate the merit of 
these challenges and to assign degrees of culpability. These ‘degrees of corruption’ 
are not often reflected in simple verdicts of guilty or not-guilty. 
f) Those accused of corruption rarely accept the allegation and those attacked as corrupt 
pretend, or sincerely claim, to have selfless virtues (defending friendship, advancing 
the public good, preserving custom, protecting individuals from witch-hunts and so 
on). What can appear as an evasion of public morality paradoxically tends to push 
against selfishness and greed, vices which are extremely difficult to justify directly in 
public. Nevertheless, defences articulate limits to the power and reach of the state and 
the public. 
g) Conceptions of corruption are, again paradoxically, both constantly shifting but also 
subject to repeated attempts to define and fix them. Debate over corruption helps to 
shift or clarify the nature of both contested norms and boundaries. Cumulatively, the 
attempts to prosecute corruption lead to a process of codification and consolidation of 
what any society finds acceptable at any one time. 
h) If corruption is thus shaped by processes of history and culture, successful anti-
corruption will be an on-going dynamic in all societies and result from, and relate to, 
any nation’s past and its culture rather than follow a set of abstract and culturally-
alien dictates.  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
rationalisation of public sector corruption but see Allen Gannett, ‘The Rationalisation of 
Political Corruption’, Public Integrity 17:2 (2015), 165-75 
11 The maxim is attributed to Thucydides. 
7 
 
 
To be sure, the pre-modern world was different to today. It was an age when fees rather 
than salaries were the norm; when social standing was as important as merit in opening 
doors; when there was no welfare state or pension system, and hence money had to be 
accumulated to provide for later infirmity. And yet the historical record is useful to think 
with. It forces us to confront why some things considered corrupt today were far more 
ubiquitous and defensible in the past, and hence what constitutes corruption. Moreover, 
other features of the past have resonances, echoes or even a legacy today: patronage, 
friendship and social norms still play a significant role in the business world and public life in 
the west; and the experience of earlier state formation and the genesis of standards of 
public office and commerce, into which corruption shines a light, have parallels even outside 
the Anglo-American heritage. 
 
Moving from the abstract to the case studies will help to illuminate these points. 
 
 
1. Social Norms 
 
A number of social norms blurred the boundaries between licit and illicit behaviour so that 
those accused of corruption could, either ingenuously or disingenuously, appeal to these 
wider codes to excuse their actions. To return to Bacon, one of the most common claims 
was that what was said to be bribery was no more than a ‘gift’, 12 ‘reward’,13 ‘gratuity’,14 
‘present’15 or ‘kindness’ from a ‘friend’.16 These terms sought to neutralise the criminal sting 
of extortion that frequently accompanied accusations of corruption, since the transfers 
were voluntary acts legitimised by the national social conventions of the time.17 Over and 
over again we encounter this desire to insist that allegedly illicit goods were not the result of 
oppression but were freely given. The extent to which this blurring of boundaries between 
licit and illicit behaviour enabled individuals either to deceive themselves about their actions 
or not even to see the line they had crossed can be seen in the diary of Samuel Pepys.18 
Pepys is interesting because he had a sharp awareness of corruption in others and was 
aware that some of the ‘gifts’ he received would not stand up to public scrutiny (he closed 
his eyes on one occasion so that he could say, if questioned, that he had not seen money fall 
out of the package he was opening), yet he habituated himself to referring to (and hence 
                                                          
12 Felicity Heal, The Power of Gifts: Gift Exchange in Early Modern England (Oxford, 2014) 
13 T[he] N[ational] A[rchives] SP 14/111/18 is an accusation against the earl of Suffolk 
‘Concerning Several Sums of Monies taken corruptly for rewards and gratuities’. 
14 The word, in the sense of a monetary gift, was coined in 1540 [OED] 
15 We shall return later on to consider ‘presents’ in relation to foreign or colonial cultures.  
16 Naomi Tadmor, Family and Friends in Eighteenth-Century England: Household, Kinship, 
and Patronage (Cambridge, 2001). 
17 Extortion was an established crime (first articulated in 1275) and many corruption cases 
were prosecuted as such.  
18 What follows summarises part of Knights, ‘Samuel Pepys and Corruption’, Parliamentary 
History 33/1 (2014), 19-35. 
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also possibly thinking of) the money and goods that he received as ‘gifts’. Sir William 
Warren, who wanted naval contracts that Pepys could award, befriended him and Pepys 
noted that he had ‘a prospect of just advantage by his friendship’.19 Indeed, Pepys described 
the liberal Warren as ‘the best friend I have ever had in this office’. Yet to others, such 
friendship smacked of cronyism. When Pepys was attacked in print in 1679, half of the tract 
against him took the form of an invented dialogue with his friend and colleague Will Hewer 
and the rest of the tract sets out a long list of exotic and sometimes expensive gifts and 
‘extraordinary fees’ that they had ‘unjustly taken’ from merchants, victuallers, ship owners 
and all sorts of seamen.20 The tract thus saw extortion where Pepys had seen only 
customary gift-giving among friends.  
Similarly gifts might be ‘rewards’ for extraordinary service or simply ‘gratuities’ 
acknowledging special social bonds or favour. Pepys talked of ‘those gratifications which 
both practice and the quality of my place might justify an expectation and acceptance 
of…when employed in matters of lawful favour to private men’.21  Thus in 1624 the earl of 
Suffolk’s defence argued that £3000pa coming from contractors to his friend Sir Thomas 
Howard ‘was proved to have been only an intentional gratuity to show their thankful 
acknowledgment of my Lord's favour towards them’.22 Yet the prosecuting counsel 
suggested that ‘if they would not have them termed extortions but gratuities, it was but to 
clothe a hare in a fox's skin, and that they were but cloaks lined with bribery.’23 Re-
description of key terms through a social lens was part of the polemical battle. 
Pepys had a notion of a sharing ‘lawful profit’ that he could legitimately take, even from 
public contracts, and this seems to have been relatively widespread even 150 years later, as 
the 1809 trial of Valentine Jones, commissary general of stores for the armed forces both on 
the Leeward islands and at Westminster, makes clear. Jones had struck a corrupt bargain 
with a contractor who agreed to pay him a share of the profits. He allegedly received over 
£150,000 in ten months. But Jones’s defence argued that ‘though in point of law it is not to 
be justified, in point of practice we know, it has happened, that men who have meant to do 
honestly and fairly have become interested with those who have provided the supplies for 
the public service upon a feeling, however false, and upon a footing not to be justified, but 
believing that if they merely shared in the fair profits, they committed no offence’.  
                                                          
19 my italics 
20 A Hue and Cry after P and H [1679], 1-2, 6. 
21 Pepys to the Brooke House Commissioners, 6 Jan. 1670, The Letters of Samuel Pepys, 
1656-1703 ed. Guy de la Bédoyère (Woodbridge, 2006), 81-2 . See also Aaron Graham, 
‘Auditing Leviathan: Corruption and State Formation in Early Eighteenth-Century Britain’ 
English Historical Review, 128/533 (2013). 
22 Historical Manuscripts Commission … Salisbury: Volume 22, 1612-1668, ed. G Dyfnallt 
Owen (London, 1971), 102. 
23 Ibid, 108. 
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The power of social conventions to blur the boundaries between licit and illict actions is also 
evident in 1783 when Charles Bembridge explained that he had not revealed the large hole 
in the accounts of the recently deceased Henry Fox because to do so would have meant 
acting as informer against his immediate boss in the army pay office, Mr Powell. The latter 
in turn seems to have concealed the sum because of his obligations to Fox. Bembridge’s 
counsel argued that his client could not be expected to ‘turn a spy, and go and tell the 
auditor that his predecessor at his office, Mr Powell, intended to commit some offence…Will 
you suffer a man to be convicted of a crime for not doing that, which if he had done, all 
mankind must have hooted and hissed him for doing?’24   
Patronage and kinship also blurred the boundaries, creating tensions – or even double vision 
- in the coherence of individual’s outlooks. Patronage was both an expected good – a system 
of preferring friends and relatives to positions of power and profit – but also a system 
vulnerable to abuse or simply to accusations of self-interestedness.25 Tradesman Thomas 
Turner of Sussex could thus both benefit from the political, social and economic patronage 
of the duke of Newcastle and also express his disapproval in his diary of the latter’s ‘private 
Interest and connection of Friends’.26 Lord Grey, one of the strongest advocates both of 
parliamentary reform, which sought to remove some of the glaring electoral corruption of 
the times, and of ‘economical reform’ (which included reducing the influence of the crown), 
was simultaneously accused of nepotism (a term coined in the late seventeenth century) 
amounting to £60,000 pa27: a satire depicted him as a grey cat whose tail was segmented 
with all the favours and offices showered on his extensive family.28  
                                                          
24 State Trials, xxii. 56. He was convicted in a judgement that helped codify the law on 
misconduct in public office. 
25 For patronage see Linda Levy Peck, Court Patronage and Corruption in Early Stuart 
England (1990).  
26 Tadmor, Family and Friends, 232. 
27 In 1828 Ellenborough put the figure at £16,000 [Three Early Nineteenth Century Diaries 
ed. Denis le Marchant and A. Aspinall (1952), 25] 
28 BM Satires 16578 ‘Lork what a long tail our cat has got’ (1831). The satire also has the 
£60,000 figure, detailing the emoluments for each of his relatives. 
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Fig.1 A satire of the nepotism of Earl Grey [BM Satires 16578 
When resigning as prime minister in 1834, Grey protested that ‘neither he nor his family 
were a farthing richer for the public monies they had received’ – but only, as one 
commentator observed, because they were a bunch of spendthrifts.29 He had, his critic 
affirmed, been ‘too eager to convert his high station into an instrument of gain for himself 
and his relatives’ and his influence was ‘diminished by a stigma of an all-grasping nepotism’. 
But Grey argued that he left office ‘with a fortune not more than sufficient to support my 
rank and station in society’ and that the relations and friends had been placed in ‘laborious 
positions’; in any case, he asked rhetorically ‘whether they are not parties likely and proper 
to have been selected for their situations, even if they had had no connexion with me?’30 
What to others seemed like nepotistic abuse of patronage was, to Grey, provision for a 
numerous family who were well qualified to serve in the places to which they had been 
promoted.   
Such examples force us to try to define what social pressures or norms were or are 
acceptable. What were or are the boundaries of friendship or obligations to family? What 
did or does society define as ‘fair’? 
2. ‘Authorised’ behaviour 
                                                          
29 William Carpenter, Peerage for the People (1837), 374-5. 
30 Hansard, HL Deb 09 July 1834 vol 24cc.1316-7. 
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Pepys’s patron the earl of Sandwich had told him at the outset of his career ‘that it was not 
the salary of any place that did make a man rich, but the opportunities of getting money 
while he is in the place’.31 Such advice certainly seemed to ‘authorise’ Pepys’s behaviour; 
and such authorisation also came from the monarch, from the logic of the structures of the 
state, and from customary practice. 
The wishes of the monarch might thus justify behaviour that others condemned. Defending 
himself against allegations of purloining public funds, the earl of Cranfield argued that even 
if he had taken the sums alleged, they were less than what King James had meant him to 
have: ‘I have not so much in my hands as your blessed father gave and intended mee’, he 
told Charles I. 32 Cranfield even hoped Charles would ‘in a kinde of a Religious observation of 
your Blessed fathers actions and intentions’ relieve him and put an end to his troubles. 
Even when not coming from the monarch, semi-official approval might also seem to come 
explicitly or implicitly from the way in which the state was structured or customarily 
operated. The sale of office – an object of criticism across the pre-modern period - was a 
practice that the state implicitly and at times explicitly permitted and sometimes even 
encouraged. Although statutes of 1389 and 1555 banned the sale of certain categories of 
office (mainly to do with the administration of justice and the royal/state revenue), large 
numbers of posts remained outside their provisions and, depending on their nature, these 
could be sold as pieces of property that were seen to belong to individual office-holders 
rather than the state or the public.33 London office-holders thus petitioned in 1697 against a 
measure to ban sale of office in the City on the grounds that it infringed property rights.34 As 
late as the 1790s civil and military offices were publicly advertised for sale in the periodical 
press, as Fig 2 illustrates.  
 
                                                          
31 Pepys Diary 16 Aug. 1660. 
32 Sackville mss Wardrobe ‘My submission to his Majesty’ 7 Dec. 1634, cited Prestwich, 
Cranfield, 500-4; TNA SP16/282 f.223. 
33 Army commissions were sold until as late as 1871. 
34 HMC Lords 1695-7, 512. 
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Fig 2: Oracle and Public Advertiser, 20 Jan 1798 
Custom and practice also  seemed to sanction behaviour that might otherwise (and to 
others living at the time) seem reprehensible. The administrators of the naval dockyards 
fought a never-ending battle with those who saw it as their customary right to take away 
‘chips’, pieces of wood that were (in theory at least) offcuts from naval work. The vigorous 
smuggling trade was another customary practice that the government nevertheless saw as a 
fraud that often involved customs officials being induced to turn a blind eye to illicit activity 
or even to being actively engaged in subverting the revenue system. In 1769 by Samuel 
Vaughan who was prosecuted for trying to bribe the Prime Minister to sell him an office in 
Jamaica, claimed that he could not alone swim against the tide of custom and practice: 
‘however Mr Vaughan might wish a reformation, and that, as general as is the evil, yet when 
the good of the community in this instance was taken into consideration, he might think 
himself justified in complying with the corrupt practice of the times’.35  
Such claims raise questions about how far official or superior sanction, or customary 
practices, could mitigate or even excuse allegations of corruption. 
3. Public Benefits 
                                                          
35 An Appeal to the Public on behalf of Samuel Vaughan Esq (1770), 100-1. See also A 
Refutation of a False Aspersion First thrown out upon Samuel Vaughan (1769). 
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Vaughan’s appeal to the ‘good of the community’ is significant since he pushed the 
argument further, suggesting that by placing competent men in post, Vaughan was restoring 
‘regularity and dispatch’, so that through his purchase of the post ‘the PUBLIC as well as 
himself would be benefited’.36 He was thus arguing that bribery was justifiable if it led to a 
greater good. 
Pepys had earlier justified his own profit if the public also gained. In 1664, after receiving 
£50, he noted ‘there is not the least word or deed I have yet been guilty of in his behalf but 
what I am sure hath been to the King’s advantage and profit of the service, nor ever will I’.37 
Again in 1670 he observed:  
no gratuity, though voluntarily offered, hath ever met with my acceptance where I 
found not the affair to which it did relate accompanied with the doing right or 
advantage to his Majesty.38 
The idea that private advantage might confer public benefit is most associated with Bernard 
de Mandeville’s Fable of the Bees (1704 and subsequently revised. So it was fitting that 
when Mandeville’s patron, Lord Chancellor Macclesfield, was impeached in 1725 for selling 
offices in the Court of Chancery, the latter invoked a set of arguments that mirrored his 
client’s ideas:  
The Publick is concerned only in the Goodness of the Officer, not how advantageous 
to him the Grant of the Office is, nor in the Inducement to which he that appointed 
him had to put him in: whether Friendship, Acquaintance, Relation, Importunity, 
great Recommendation or a Present.39  
Macclesfield pursued this defence further, when defending his appointments of court 
officers:  ‘is it material how well I loved him, how nearly he is related, who it was that 
persuaded me to prefer him, or what he gave me on that Account, whether before, or after 
he was put in? …If the Publick can have all the Benefit it can have, where is the Immorality? 
Where is the crime, if I have an Advantage too?’40 Macclesfield was arguing that there was 
                                                          
36 Ibid, 99. 
37 Pepys Diary, 5 Jan. 1664 
38 Pepys to the Brooke House Commissioners, 6 Jan. 1670, The Letters of Samuel Pepys, 82. 
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no conflict of interest between private and public advantage.41 The House of Lords 
nevertheless found him guilty and imposed a hefty fine.  
An appeal to the public interest was also –successfully - made by the nabobs who returned 
from India having made their fortunes. In these cases there were two ‘public interests’ that 
could be invoked: those of the East India Company and of the British state. Lord Clive, who 
gained great wealth in India, developed a reasonably coherent distinction between 
legitimate, honourable gifts and corrupt, dishonourable ones that turned, in part, on this 
sense of putting service to the public interest first. If the national interest was served, and 
the Company interest was not harmed, then presents were allowable: 
When Presents are received as Price of Services to the Nation, to the Company and 
to that Prince that bestowed those Presents; when they were not exacted from him 
by Compulsion; when he is in a state of Independence and can do with his money as 
he pleases; and when they are not received to the disadvantage of the Company; he 
holds presents so received not dishonourable: But when they are received from a 
dependent Prince, when they are received for no Services whatever, and when they 
are received not voluntarily, he holds the Receipt of such Presents  dishonourable.42 
On 21 May 1773, when a vote of censure was imminent, he again declared that he was 
guilty only of advancing the Company’s fortunes and that he had ‘laid a strong and lasting 
foundation for [its] prosperity and welfare’.43 This was sufficiently convincing for the House 
of Commons to pass a motion praising Clive for having rendered ‘great and meritorious 
Services to this Country’, even when at the same time they acknowledged that he had 
received ‘presents’.44  
When Thomas Rumbold (who had been Clive’s aide-de-camp) was the subject of a 
parliamentary bill of pains and penalties in 1783 for his allegedly corrupt administration as 
governor of Madras (1778-81), he similarly argued that all the actions that he had taken, 
which were condemned as evidence of corruption, were in fact intended for the good of the 
East India Company. Despite claims that he had ‘acted in direct opposition to the Company's 
interest’ he promised to ‘prove all these measures to have been wise, honorable, and just 
arrangements, for the Company's interest’. If orders from London were against the 
Company and national interest, Rumbold argued, he must have discretion to deviate from 
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them; indeed, this was ‘meritorious disobedience’. Such arguments appeared to win the day 
and the bill against Rumbold was allowed to fall. He went on to develop an interesting 
argument about the relationship between motives and behaviour:    
the argument of innocence operates reciprocally between the motives, and the acts: 
If the motives imputed [for corruption] are disproved, I infer, by fair, and sound 
principles of reasoning, that his real motives were blameless, at least, if not 
meritorious;-it's not therefore likely, that his measures themselves will dishonor him: 
On the other hand, if the measures are to his honor, the motives to them are not 
likely to have been criminal.45 
Warren Hastings had even more success with the appeal to public interest and a 
presumption of innocent motives. His defence was multi-faceted but included the notion 
that his governorship of India had greatly enhanced the national interest. He denied ‘that he 
ever entertained any of the base or corrupt Views or Designs or was actuated by any such 
Motives’ as had been alleged against him. On the contrary, he ‘did steadily and uniformly, 
according to the best of his Judgement, and the means within his Power, pursue and 
endeavour to advance the Interests of the East India Company and the British Nation’. He 
had only accepted presents, he claimed, for the benefit of the East India Company, which 
both knew of them and desperately needed money in India to pay for troops, and his 
extraordinary service on behalf of the British interest outweighed any questionable acts he 
might have committed, including the taking of bribes.46 Any errors were simply under the 
pressure of ‘uniform Difficulty and Exigence’ and therefore any ‘Imperfections’ should be 
‘imputed to Error and Infirmity, and not to any corrupt or criminal Intention’.47 Hastings, 
too, was acquitted. 
One of the most difficult areas to evaluate was thus how far private and public interests 
were compatible. It is still a morally fraught question on which divergent views are held. 
 
4. Unfairness and Political Motives 
 
Another difficult area is how far to take into account the political motivations behind attacks 
on corruption. Whistleblowers, for example, suffered an unfairness in their treatment that 
they (often rightly) saw as stemming from political motives to neutralise their activities and 
credibility. In the early seventeenth century Sir Stephen Proctor was appointed corruption-
finder general by the government, but in 1610 found himself accused in Parliament of 
corruption by the very interest groups whose behaviour he had targeted. Proctor said he 
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was a political victim who had been ‘geven over into ye hands of particular & mercyless 
enemyes’.48 James Gilchrist, a purser during the Napoleonic Wars, was similarly prosecuted 
for corruption when he himself was attempting to expose the corruption that he saw as 
endemic in the Navy. Gilchrist wrote a torrent of letters to those in authority and discerned 
a ‘conspiracy’ to silence him.  
The notion of corruption involved the breach of equity and fairness; but those accused of 
corruption could also appeal to these values. Rumbold said that whereas Bacon, Middlesex 
and Macclesfield had directly been accused of corruption, he faced mere ‘insinuation’ and 
that the antipathies towards him arose from prejudices ‘against every Eastern Governor 
who has made large acquisitions to his English fortune’. The charge of corruption was thus, 
he thought, unfairly being used to smear his name: ‘it's the insinuated guilt of corruption, 
that criminates, at the mercy of prejudice, every act, and every word of the culprit. If a bad 
motive is wanted, Corruption supplies the defect … Insinuated corruption is never to end’.49 
Moreover, Rumbold said, he had been treated differently to others who had only been 
reprimanded or re-employed after their dismissal; and the evidence against him had been 
obtained by bribing informers. Rumbold claimed that if he was guilty, so were others who 
were not being prosecuted. Nor was it fair, he said, that guilt could be inferred from riches: 
‘The corrupt acquisition even of Indian wealth never, till this day, was inferred from the 
wealth itself; or the owner of it compelled by an accuser to account for it.’50 The 
prosecution had to prove his misconduct; and Rumbold considered himself ‘as a Political 
victim’.51 The prosecution came to nothing.  
Posing as victim of unfair, often politically motivated prosecution, was a common strategy. 
Dudley Carleton’s son thought the attacks on Cranfield in 1624 were certainly politically 
motivated by the contending factional disputes that riddled the early Stuart court and 
Parliament: ‘The world cries “ Down with him”; there has been no man in England these two 
hundred years whose ruin has been so thirsted after by all sorts of people’.52 John Aislabie, 
the Chancellor of the Exchequer who was caught up (not without cause) in the 
investigations into the South Sea Bubble, complained that he been made a scape-goat, 
‘sacrific’d to appease the Fury of the mis-guided Multitude’. Similarly Theodore Hook, 
whose negligence in office in Mauritius enabled the corruption of his juniors, declared ‘I 
cannot but consider myself hardly dealt with’ when he was prosecuted and other defaulting 
officers were not. Hook was a Tory polemicist and thought he was ‘sacrificed to the 
virulence of Whigs and Radicals, excited against me by the suspicion which is current that I 
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have been a successful writer against them’.53 Since nearly every allegation of corruption 
had some political motive, in the sense that it benefited the accuser, either individually or 
institutionally or through group-advantage, in some way this was a common and often not 
an unreasonable counter-claim even if it did little to confer innocence. It reminds us that 
corruption was a politically charged weapon that won personal or group advantage and that 
this made, and makes,  it much more difficult for the state and public to decide on guilt. 
It was not just groups within the state that sought advantage, for the state itself was 
accused by some East India men of seeking to use corruption as the tool to seize its assets. 
The author of one pro-Company tract, Joseph Price, sought to show  
that the introduction in which those vile insinuations are contained, was fabricated in 
this country, and calculated to serve a particular purpose … an idea had been taken up 
by the Minister of the day, to claim the territory held by the East India Company, in 
behalf of the Crown. To facilitate this arbitrary measure, it was necessary to make use of 
every means to blacken the East India Company, and their servants abroad, in the eyes 
of the nation.54 
In this version of the defence, institutions could be as victimised as individuals. Price 
thought it was unfair that all East Indiamen ‘have been proscribed in the lump’, with the 
corruption of a few made to apply to the corruption of all.55 ‘In all societies, some few 
individuals will run riot’ and the barrel should not be condemned because of a few bad 
apples.56 
5. Geographical Morality 
 
The defences made by Clive, Hastings and Rumbold raise another important issue: as Britons 
expanded their empire they also encountered places and peoples whose cultural differences 
with the metropole either offered temptation or a set of values that were in tension with 
those at home, or where colonial society and mind-sets put pressures on behaviour and 
reshaped expectations and self-restraints.  Colonial cultures were thus used to justify or 
excuse what critics, who sought more universal standards, saw as corruption. Such issues 
came to the fore during the trial of Warren Hastings, which saw a clash between what chief 
prosecutor Edmund Burke saw as universal but also British values and those which he 
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claimed Hastings had systematised in India after adopting Asian habits.57 Burke summarised 
Hastings’ defence as a claim that ‘actions in Asia do not bear the same moral qualities which 
the same actions would bear in Europe’, a moral relativism that he condemned as 
‘geographical morality, by which the duties of men, in publick and private situations are not 
to be governed by their relation to the great Governour of the Universe or by their relation 
to mankind, but by climates …[where] all the virtues die’.58 Hastings’s defence had indeed 
claimed it would be unfair to judge the governor general’s actions by the standards 
applicable in England:  
the general Nature and Quality of many Measures now the Subject of Charge against 
him, considerably depend upon the Manners, Customs, Principles and Laws, peculiar 
to the Countries in which such Measures were adopted, and cannot therefore, as he 
conceives, properly be judged of by the same Rules and Principles as would 
determine the Quality of like Actions in the Country where he is now called to 
answer for the same’.59  
Burke, by contrast, thought that ‘the laws of morality are the same everywhere; and that 
there is no action which would pass for extortion, of peculation, of bribery and of 
oppression in England that is not an act of extortion, of peculation, of bribery and 
oppression in Europe, Asia, Africa and all the world over’.60  
The differences of culture prompted related lines of defence. One was that the accused 
remained men of integrity because they might easily have acted a great deal worse, given 
the extraordinary temptations on offer and the very different environment, in which 
traditional restraints were absent. In defending the early East Indiamen, Joseph Price argued 
that  
so far were they from exercising acts of cruelty and barbarity on individuals, to 
accumulate wealth, that they neglected to take what, by the law of arms, and the 
constant and universal custom of that country, had become their right.61 
Lord Clive had earlier made a similar point when attacked in 1772 (though the precise 
record of the speech appears obscure and it might even be apocryphal). He allegedly told an 
investigating parliamentary committee:  
The Battle of Plassey [which established the British territorial hold on Bengal] had 
placed me in such a situation, the prince was dependent on my pleasure, an opulent 
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city lay at my mercy, its rich bankers bid against each other for my smiles. I walked 
through vaults which were thrown open to me alone piled on either hand with gold 
and jewels. Mr Chairman, at this moment, I stand astonished at my own 
moderation.62 
Colonial power often pushed political and economic interests together, opening the way for 
accusations that authority was used corruptly to advance private economic interests. One 
answer was a racial one, suggesting that it was better to line the pockets of relatively 
civilised Britons than those of uncivilised and more oppressive natives. Francis Sykes, 
Resident of Murshidabad, felt no objections should be held against his considerable profits: 
‘It was this, whether it should go into a blackman’s pocket or my own’.63 The idea that 
Asians were naturally despotic extortioners meant that Britons must be better rulers, 
especially if they defined corruption in terms of administration misconduct that could then 
be purged, even if that left (and strengthened) colonial subordination.  
An alternative, though complementary, response to the colonial intertwining of political and 
economic interests was provided by Paul Benfield, who argued his profit was simply the 
result of good business. Burke thought Benfield at least as, if not more, corrupt than 
Hastings, 'a criminal who long since ought to have fattened the region kites with his offal'.64 
Yet Benfield claimed he was simply a man of business, without any political interests or 
influence. He admitted that he had accumulated ‘a greater money resource than perhaps 
any other European in that country ever possessed’ and that he had enjoyed many 
government contracts; but these were due ‘neither to predeliction, nor favour, but merely 
to the lowness of the proposals [ie the contract tenders] which he offered.’ Benfield  
claimed he was simply ‘a fair merchant and banker, pursuing his business with attention, 
assiduity and industry’.65 Not only was there a geographical morality but also a business 
morality that pretended to be insulated from political power even as it craved such 
influence.  
Global commercial ventures therefore raised, and continue to raise, questions about the 
morality of adopting the practices of other nations and about how far government 
contractors could, and can, operate insulated from political considerations. 
6. Accounting issues 
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Finally, a common defence against allegations of corruption was to say that mistakes in the 
accounts were unintentional, the result either of practical difficulties or genuine error for 
which punishment was inappropriate. The late seventeenth-century paymaster of the army, 
Richard Ranelagh, thus argued that the very large hole in his accounts – amounting to some 
£900,000 – was the result of the inherent confusions caused when large armies fought 
overseas and had to be supplied through large numbers of intermediaries. Discrepancies 
between the numbers of soldiers being paid and the actual number on the ground could 
thus be explained by death, displacement, the churn of war, and the inadequate records 
available to the paymaster, not deliberate falsification.66 Government departments were 
slow to adopt mercantile practices of double accounting, which might have made such 
defences less easy to make, and the growing complexity and extent of the state’s finances 
often obscured the extent to which corruption had occurred. Over a century after Ranelagh 
had lodged his appeals, Theodor Hook, Treasury and Accomptant General of Mauritius 
(appointed for patronage reasons, without any qualification for the post) argued that the 
accounting errors which led to the embezzlement of £12,000 were not his fault. His only 
crime was ‘a remissness in the superintendence of people in an office over where I had no 
control’ and he claimed he had committed ‘no intentional criminality’.67 Such cases seek 
distinctions to be made between logistical difficulties and incompetence on the one hand 
and pre-meditated corruption on the other. 
Corruption might also be mitigated by government needs. In seeking to reform, the 
government needed to know the vulnerabilities of their own systems and hence needed the 
expert knowledge, even of those of doubtful morality. Thus Edmund Burke, the hammer of 
corruption when practiced by East India men, strenuously defended Charles Bembridge, 
who (as noted earlier) was successfully prosecuted for misconduct in office, and even had 
him reinstated him. Burke needed Bembridge’s expertise in order to reform the Pay Office 
which had ‘been rather like a private office of account than a public administration’ and 
publicly praised Bembridge’s ‘disinterestedness’ in helping him. Burke spoke in his favour 
during three parliamentary debates, even lauding him for having ‘the highest character for 
integrity’, a defence that earned him a reprimand from fellow MPs for trying to ‘screen from 
punishment a notorious delinquent’.68 Explaining away corruption in auditing accounts was 
sometimes necessary for even the most ardent anti-corruption reformer.   
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Conclusion 
This article has analysed many assertions of innocence, and argued that these involved 
strategies that redefined or re-described allegedly reprehensible or illegal acts as benign, 
socially acceptable, in the public interest, unfairly or politically motivated, the result of 
different ethical and moral cultures or simple logistical and accounting errors. Each tactic 
sought to deny the fundamental charge of being vicious: self-interest, greed, oppression, 
exploitation and venality were re-described in a more neutral way or even said to be part of 
virtuous behaviour that either promoted the public good or at least did not harm it. The 
attempts to provide a self-vindicating justification may also stem from a desire, in the 
religious, to quieten the conscience or, in the more secular, a refusal to accept the guilt and 
shame others sought, through scandal, to impose on them.69 Guilt stems from a sense of 
transgressing moral and legal rules, and shame from a sense of defect of character, so 
refuting both the rules and vindicating one’s character enabled those accused, who tended 
to be wealthy and of a relatively high status, to cling on to or reassert their ‘honour’ and 
rightful place in society. 
The cases discussed raise important questions about what, in the past and present, are 
legitimate excuses or mitigating circumstances for actions alleged to be corrupt. Depending 
on how far such excuses or mitigations are accepted, an individual might be considered 
more or less culpable. We might thus identify degrees of corruption that consider a range of 
factors, including social, moral, customary and legal norms as well the motives of those 
bringing the accusations, together with the extent of personal intent to profit at the 
expense of others, whether that profit was excessive or obtained by undue pressure, and 
the degree of the individual’s breach of ideas of trust and equity. In judging corruption, we 
might also want to evaluate how far individuals or systems were at fault: in a corrupt system 
even men with honest intentions might be forced to be complicit. All this involves more 
than thinking about what social scientists call ‘petty’ and ‘grand corruption’. Each corruption 
case is composed of a mixture of personal, institutional, societal, moral, legal and cultural 
factors, each of which needs to be carefully weighed and evaluated. Although corruption 
seems a black and white crime, with a simple verdict of guilty or not-guilty – and the way 
the charge of corruption blackens everything about an individual or system is a large part of 
its power - there are degrees of culpability that have to be carefully calibrated. These 
calibrations will change over time, as what is deemed mitigation at one time will be 
dismissed or minimised at another; they will depend on national context and culture; and 
they will involve the public as well as the law.  
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Given that corruption has deep historical roots and that its contexts shaped how it could be 
attacked and defended, a study of corruption in the past also raises questions about 
whether the morality of anti-corruption, and indeed morality more generally, is culturally 
specific and changes over time and space. If the definition of corruption is fluid, and even to 
some extent shaped by the politicised forces attacking it, or if corruption cases highlight 
different notions of culture across cultural and geographical space (as for example, occurred 
in pre-modern India where British traders encountered huge temptations and a different 
culture), are corruption and anti-corruption simply loose and relativistic concepts that have 
relatively little analytical or ethical utility? Might it not be better, as the anthropologist 
Olivier de Sardan has suggested, to analyse corruption within the ‘corruption complex’ of 
any one society?70 
Historians have not been unaware of these questions. Joel Hurstfield argued that we cannot 
anachronistically apply modern standards to the past, nor rely on polemical and politically-
motivated accusations as a gauge to measure how much corruption existed. The word 
corruption had, Hurstfield thought, ‘become the stock-in-trade of political controversy … it 
is the easiest charge to make and the most difficult charge to refute’ and he suggested that 
‘the frontiers of corruption are themselves vague and undefined’, with an evolving and 
shifting meaning which ‘leaves us without any independent criterion of value to the 
historian’. Using the word corruption before the mid-nineteenth century, he insisted, 
is full of hazards…it ignores the economic and social structure of a past age; it 
underrates the problems of financing and administering government in a relatively 
under-developed community … If we decide to treat the use of public revenue for 
private gain as corruption, then we must not only consider men like Sir Robert Cecil 
and Sir Robert Walpole but a vast miscellany of people, most of them not in the 
public service, who diverted public revenue into private purses. It is for reasons such 
as this that I believe that the word corruption, with its high moral overtones, all too 
often obscures rather than illuminates the issues which confront historians.71 
Ironically, and perhaps because his views stemmed from his work on leading state officials 
and the institutions over which they presided, Hurstfield’s arguments reflect the mindset of 
those accused of corruption with whom this article is concerned: they frequently rejected 
the term as inapplicable to them, not so much because it was anachronistic but because it 
obscured the legitimate reasons for their behaviour. In other words, the historian’s denial of 
the utility of the word corruption has in part absorbed the denials of the accused. 
                                                          
70 J. P. Olivier de Sardan, ‘A moral economy of corruption in Africa?’ The Journal of Modern 
African Studies, 37, 1 (1999), pp. 25-52. I am grateful to Mark Philp for this reference and for 
discussions on this theme more generally. 
71 Joel Hurstfield, Freedom, Corruption and Government in Elizabethan England, chapter5 
and 7, quotations at 139, 159-60. 
23 
 
Attempts to confront these challenges and to see corruption from the perspective of the 
mass of the people, rather than from that of the elite, led anthropologist James Scott to 
develop a notion of ‘proto-corruption’: behaviour that would now be called corrupt but 
which was not seen as such in the past. He argued that corruption was defined by the law, 
which evolved over time; but that there were practices that were only later made illegal 
which could be analysed and compared across time and space:  
patterns of corruption can be related to the character of the political system and to 
the nature and rate of socio-economic change in a way that suggests meaningful 
parallels not only between western and non-western nations but also between 
regimes that have long since disappeared and regimes that thrive today.72   
Yet Scott is in some ways close to Hurstfield, since he too suggests that ‘much corruption is 
in a real sense a product of the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Only the rise of 
the modern nation-state, with its mass participation, broadly representative bodies and 
elaborate civil service codes, signalled the transformation of the view of government office, 
and even kingship, from a private right into a public responsibility’.73 
Both Hurstfield and Scott make very important points that we have to see corruption in the 
context of its times and that corruption has not had a fixed and universal meaning; but both 
miss the rather essential point that corruption was a concept and word used by those living 
in the pre-modern state. Given that ‘corruption’ was not, then, an anachronism, and was 
widely used to describe a host of different types of moral, social, political and religious 
decay, we have to recover its meanings, even if, from the perspective of modern political 
science, corruption is not a particularly sharp analytical tool. Dismissing corruption as 
irrelevant and anachronistic, or re-categorising pre-modern forms as something else, 
distracts us from the use that contemporaries made of the term. It is true that corruption 
can be a slippery word, meaning different things to different people at different times. 
Hurstfield consequently thought that ‘the word corruption is not helpful in the historical 
context unless the historian has first made up his own mind about the meaning of the term 
and has evidence that, in fact, corruption has occurred’.74  And yet it is precisely because 
corruption was a word and concept used in the past that we cannot dismiss it. Rather, 
because it was a keyword with rhetorical power and the capacity to mobilise individual and 
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state action, we should be interested in uncovering its different meanings and how it was 
both used and refuted.  
What is striking about many of the arguments analysed in this article is how keen 
defendants were to redefine corruption to make behaviour that others found reprehensible 
compatible with prevailing customs and mores. In bringing accusations, for whatever 
reason, contemporaries did identify a boundary that they thought had been crossed – a 
boundary that was as much moral and political as legal (given the paucity of legislation 
dealing with corruption outside of electoral law). Anti-corruption thus helped to define the 
boundaries of ‘corruption’. Similarly, refutations of corruption helped to destabilise those 
attempts at clearer definition and sought to redefine behaviour that some saw as corrupt in 
a more benign or even positive way. The material examined in this article is thus part of a 
linguistic and conceptual struggle over the nature of corruption, and this was a struggle that 
was often political and had political (and certainly had personal) consequences. Charting this 
struggle is to chart the evolution of the concept and language of corruption. Such a contest 
over definition matters because it did not simply concern the principal actors, but had a 
wider resonance: corruption cases and discourse became a persistent feature of the 
burgeoning print culture of the period, which periodically produced waves of press debate 
from the 1640s onwards. Public discussion about what constituted corruption was thus a 
key part of the discourse of the pre-modern era.  
As we have seen, corruption was a contested term with ill-defined boundaries. Indeed, such 
cases suggest that the definition of corruption has always been, and will always be, disputed 
and in flux. Part of the value of the term ‘corruption’ to its users may in fact be that it is at 
once ambiguous and available to and contestable by all, providing a reconfigurable and 
highly politically charged conceptual space in which different versions of ideal forms of 
government can be imagined – in part through the negatives articulated by those attacking 
what they perceive to be corrupt. The process of denial and explanation is thus part of this 
on-going and shifting argument over what constitutes corrupt behaviour. The denial of 
corruption indicates how far such discussions were, and are, inherently part of a larger 
discussion about socio-cultural practices and norms. A culture of gift-giving and other social 
institutions such as friendship, patronage and sale of office, together with an evolving 
notion that the public interest could be advanced through the promotion of private interest,  
inherently blurred the lines between public and private, licit and illicit behaviour. This 
suggests that the defences against corruption need not be seen as just wily, conscious 
subterfuges (though on occasion they may have been that) or conscious ‘legitimation 
strategies’, to use the phrase of Mark Granovetter, but sprang from the cultural logic of the 
times and might reflect different conceptions of what constituted corrupt behaviour.75  
                                                          
75 Mark Granovetter, ‘The Social Construction of Corruption’, in V. Nee and R. Swedberg, On 
Capitalism (2007). 
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Part of the argument that corruption is an irrelevant concept for the pre-modern past stems 
from the idea that Weberian or Benthamite ideals of public service were peculiarly 
nineteenth century conceptions. But by looking at the denials of corruption, and the 
responses they provoked, we can in fact discern a history of the evolution of nineteenth 
century notions over the course of several hundred years. Ideals of transparency, 
accountability, integrity, disinterestedness and impartiality did not appear out of the blue in 
the early nineteenth century. Rather they were the result of much longer clashes over the 
meaning of corruption and the product of a particular cultural and political history, even if 
some of those ideals resonated with similar process of bureaucratisation, state formation 
and Enlightenment occurring in other European countries. And if that is right, it means that 
the historical story is essential to understanding not only how ‘corruption’ evolved as a 
concept but also how successful anti-corruption in any nation will result from, and relate to, 
its past and its culture.76 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
76 See also my ‘Old Corruption: What British History can tell us about Corruption today’, 
report for Transparency International, downloadable at 
http://www.transparency.org.uk/publications/old-corruption-what-british-history-can-tell-
us-about-corruption-today/ 
